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Itranspired he could survive defeat by Grimsby. Survive an important continental showpiece versus a particularly poor Spurs sides for many years. He withstood home defeats to West Ham and Wolves, finishing 15th, the tactical inflexibility, laying waste to some of the club’s most promising homegrown talent, the 32% win rate, labeling the squad the poorest in Manchester United history. But there was one adversary against whom the Portuguese coach was not permitted to engage. You come at the sporting director, and you best not miss.

Unfortunately, like many a top-flight defender in Blackburn’s championship 1994-95 season, Amorim came at the executive and appears to have failed. Even the most distracted of readers will notice the irony here: a coach who frequently berated his squad for failing in individual battles succumbing in the face of the white heat and animal charisma of a England's top division's most intimidating football executives.

In truth, this entire painful saga seems to paint Jason Wilcox in a different perspective. Perhaps it might have been tempting, based on his nine months of experience at Southampton, to view Jason Wilcox as merely a functionary within the club's structure: a man who owed his position as much to his close relationship with his former boss Omar Berrada as any demonstrable skill. How wrong everyone was. By masterfully outmanoeuvring the club's celebrated manager, just as he bested the hapless a previous executive before him, he has demonstrated to be among the sport’s strategic masterminds: a strategic mind that United’s mid-table rivals will now be justifiably concerned.

The Tactical Conflict Regarding System & Philosophy

To illustrate, this was the director who being involved in the leadership that hired the rigid 3-4-3 advocate the coach in the first place, played a key role in trying to persuade Amorim to ditch his favored 3-4-3. Naturally, these entreaties met a certain resistance. However, these judgements carry more weight when delivered from the mouth of a man the impeccable football pedigree he possesses, a veteran of three England caps and a role in a championship team decades past.

Maybe eventually he might agree to outline his thought processes publicly. Perhaps at some point he might be asked why Amorim is departing with a full payout, without any compensation reduction clause in place. But Jason Wilcox speaks rarely publicly, and with very good reason. The real thinkers in football – men like him – simply operate at a level exceeding our mundane comprehension. Were he to speak, most likely all we would hear is a series of high-frequency signals and complex calculations. Wanting is not quite equivalent to being ready to comprehend it.

The Ultimate Power In the Throne

Naturally, by focusing our attention on Jason Wilcox we overlook the real power behind the club's current leadership. Jason Wilcox is, in reality, merely executing the commands of his ultimate line manager the billionaire owner, who privately has made very clear his desire for a four-man defense. It is reported, Ratcliffe has also proposed playing Bryan Mbeumo in a wing-back role. The owner is eager for United to embrace data science and metrics. According to ESPN, in an executive meeting soon after his minority ownership, he announced that United’s style of play “will be decided in this room”.

After all, Sir Jim is a specialist in these intricate football matters, drawing from his background in petrochemicals and yachting. Most importantly he remains immensely wealthy, and it is known, the rich are superior: more perceptive, more wise, more tactically astute, simply better. Who else could one trust to manage an enlightened programme of cost-cutting, the construction of a new stadium that appears similar to an abstract design, the signing of a new striker?

A Modern Football Order: Directors Above Managers

This is a trend that is becoming prevalent in top-tier football. Historically, clubs foolishly entrusted big footballing decisions to low-level employees like managers, scouts – players themselves. Perhaps it was once possible for an up-and-coming, innovative manager with ideas and drive to go into a club and implement their plan through to completion. Yet how many companies have such individuals set up? What number of mass redundancies have they overseen? Far preferable to invest genuine authority where it belongs: the executive class, the casually dressed executives, the individuals with impressive LinkedIn profiles. It is wiser to decide the strategy in the boardroom and appoint someone who will adapt their offering to suit. If coaches were formerly chefs, they are now more like Deliveroo drivers: not responsible for the product, but still ultimately answerable should it be delivered poorly or fails of the box.

Nowadays, a coach's role is increasingly less about crafting the philosophy and more about marketing it: the front-facing representative of the operation, the visible figurehead of an organisation they can do little to influence. A coach at Chelsea takes a squad of very young players into the Champions League and wins two medium-sized trophies, and essentially is dismissed for speaking out. A manager at Celtic sees his reputation ruined while the people who appointed him continue to make errors another day.

The Neoliberal Game: Responsibility for the Coaches

And perhaps in a small way this represents neoliberalism in action: the elevation of a gilded overclass who can never be wrong, whose decisions are always untouchable, whose errors can always be resolved by sacking without explanation. Appoint the 3-4-3 coach only to fire them for using too much that system. Bring in the process guy and later bin him for taking too long. And above all be grateful; for your modest increases in ticket costs, for the latest summer signings, for the reality that the grownups – however well qualified – remain in control.